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Abstract—Trilateration is one of the well-known threat 
models to the user's location privacy in location-based apps; 
especially those contain highly sensitive information such as 
dating apps. The threat model mainly bases on the publicly 
shown distance from a targeted victim to the adversary to 
pinpoint the victim's location. As a countermeasure, most of 
location-based apps have already implemented the "hide 
distance" function, or added noise to the publicly shown 
distance in order to protect their user's location privacy. The 
effectiveness of such approaches however is still questionable. 
Therefore, in this paper, we investigate how the popular 
location-based dating apps are currently protecting their user's 
privacy by testing three popular GLBT-focused apps: Grindr, 
Jack’d, and Hornet. We found that Jack’d has the most privacy 
issues among the three apps. As one of our findings, we also 
show how the adversary can still figure out the location of a 
targeted victim even when the "show distance" function is 
disabled in Grindr. Without using sophisticated hacking 
techniques, our proposed model (called colluding-trilateration) 
is still very effective and efficient at locating the targeted victim, 
and of course in a so-called "legal" manner, because we only 
utilize the information that can be obtained just as same as any 
other ordinary user. In case of Hornet, although it has adopted 
location obfuscation in its system, we were not only able to 
discover its noise-adding pattern by conducting empirical 
analysis, but also able to apply the colluding trilateration used 
in Grindr to locate the targeted victim regardless of the location 
obfuscation. Our study thus raises an urgent alarm to the users 
of those location-based apps in general and GLBT-focused 
dating apps in particular about their privacy. Finally, the paper 
concludes by suggesting some possible solutions from the 
viewpoints of both the LBS provider and the user considering 
the implementation cost and the trade-off of utility. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
OWADAYS, thanks to the advancement of the Global 
Positioning System (GPS), most of the smart phones 
have a built-in GPS receiver, which assists to estimate the 
location information with accuracy up to just a few meters. 
Taking this advantage, location-based applications (aka: 
location-based services or LBS) are getting more dominant in 
the smart phone application market. Just a decade ago, one 
still had to use paper map or ask for direction when going to 
an unfamiliar area; while young people were surfing around 
online chat rooms to look for friends at that time. However, 
the introduction of LBS has changed our lifestyle and the way 
that people interact with each other thanks to its undeniable 
convenience. For instance, one can easily find the nearest 
restaurant, convenience store or shopping mall by using 
application like Google Map; or hang out with friends by 
using application like Find My Friends, etc. 
A. Privacy in General 
Nevertheless, in the era of Information and 
Communications Technology, along with censorship and 
massive surveillance in cyberspace, the problem of 
information leakage has also become more and more severe. 
Tim Cook, the CEO of Apple Inc., used to say at the White 
House Cyber Security Summit in early 2015 that: "Privacy is 
a matter of life and death" [1]. As people increasingly keep 
more sensitive personal information in their phone, big 
agencies and companies like Apple have been working hard 
to provide the best protection to their customer‘s private 
information. However, an absolute privacy and a completely 
perfect countermeasure to prevent future data breaches still 
remain as headache matters. According to the Tenth Annual 
Cost of Data Breach Study published by IBM in 2015, the 
average consolidated total cost of a data breach is $3.8 
million, increasing 23% since 2013. The report also points 
out that the cost incurred for each lost or stolen record that 
has sensitive and confidential information increased 6% from 
a consolidated average of $145 to $154 [2]. 
Among personally identifiable information, location is 
considered as one of the most essential factors since the leak 
of location information can consequently lead to the 
disclosure of other sensitive private information such as 
occupations, hobbies, daily routines, and social relationships 
[3]. In spite of many attack techniques [4], [5] that have been 
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 studied by the research community since then, the protection 
of location privacy from both LBS provider and user has not 
been sufficiently and appropriately taken into account. Thus, 
in this study, we investigate the current status of location 
privacy preserving in popular GLBT-focused dating 
applications to have a clearer view on the issue, and observe 
how it is being protected in the real-life practice under both 
already-known threat (i.e. trilateration) and its enhanced 
version (i.e. colluding trilateration) proposed by our group. 
B. Privacy Concerns in GLBT-focused Applications 
First of all, it is important to emphasize that it is not 
because of hatred or discrimination that makes us opt for 
investigating GLBT-focused applications like Grindr, Jack'd 
and Hornet. But, because of their popularity, possession of 
highly-sensitive information, and the huge number of users
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that make these applications highly vulnerable to 
cyber-attack like the case of Ashley Madison [6]. In addition, 
it is also because GLBT-focused dating applications like 
Grindr, Jack‘d, and Hornet are location-sensitive, and their 
users depend on the publicly shown distance information to 
look for nearby people to meet up right away for hookup 
(most of the time), thus potentially exposed to the risk of 
being located. 
As stated in [7], there are still many Islamic nations where 
homosexuality carries the death penalty. Most recently, there 
were several gay men in Syria lured by ISIS terrorists to go 
out on dates, and later executed publicly by stoning as 
reported in [8]. Even in those regions like North America and 
Western Countries, which are thought to be more 
open-minded, the GLBT community is still not widely 
accepted. More or less, people belong to the GLBT 
community are still facing the problem of being attacked, 
harassed or discriminated [9]. Such cases show that 
protecting privacy of the user of GLBT-focused application 
is a nontrivial task, and should not be neglected by the LBS 
providers. Because the location information together with 
other information such as height, weight, age, and hobby can 
be used to accurately disclose the targeted individuals. Later, 
the compromised information from those victims such as 
occupation, address, or frequently visiting places, daily 
routines and social relationships can be used to intimidate for 
money, or even lead to physical harassment. At this point, it 
is understandable why Tim Cook says: "Privacy is a matter of 
life and death" since he also came out as a member of the 
GLBT community in October 2014 [10]. 
C. Organization 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We will 
introduce our experimental environment in the last part of 
this section. In Section II, Jack‘d, Grindr and Hornet are 
investigated in terms of location privacy. By employing our 
proposed colluding-trilateration, we will demonstrate how 
the user's location still can be accurately discovered even 
when countermeasures like location anonymization and 
 
1 According to [22], both Grindr and Jack‘d currently have more than 5 
million active users, while there are more than 4 million active users in 
Hornet. To examine that, at the time of writing this paper, we tried inputting 
the terms such as ―gay dating‖ or ―gay hookup‖ in to Appcrawlr, which is a 
semantic mobile application discovery powered by Softonic. The search 
engine indeed returned Grindr, Jack‘d and Hornet on the top of the result list 
sorted in the order of number of downloads. 
location obfuscation have been implemented. In Section III, 
other privacy concerns are discussed with real life 
experiments. In this section, we will also introduce a 
side-channel attack fashion that can be conducted due to the 
current design of Jack'd. Finally, from the viewpoints of both 
LBS provider and user, we then give some possible solutions, 
and wrap up the paper in Section IV. 
D. Experiment Setup 
The trilateration threat model actually can be conducted in 
a physical way that the adversary carries his device around to 
three different places and notes down the distances shown 
from his position to the victim. However, in order to have an 
easily manageable experimental environment, we employ 
three virtual machines that host Android OS to play the role 
of adversaries. Each machine is then set to be in positions 
around our institute as follows: 
• Victim is an account run on a real iPhone 5, locates at 
Science Frontier Laboratory, Kyoto University with 
coordinates (35.02350485, 135.77687703). 
• Adversary A1 is located at Demachi-yanagi Station 
with coordinates (35.03051251, 135.77327415). 
• Adversary A2 is located at Heian Shrine with 
coordinates (35.01598257, 135.78242585). 
• Adversary A3 is located at Kyoto Imperial Palace 
with coordinates (35.02258561, 135.76493382). 
Each Android machine is then equipped with Fake-GPS
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so that their positions can be freely set to any corner of the 
world. At the time of writing this paper, we did our 
experiments with Grindr (version 2.2.8), Jack‘d (version 
3.3.2), and Hornet (version 2.7.1). Next, to capture packets in 
Subsection III.A, we set up a proxy machine, and use 
Microsoft Network Monitor (version 3.4) to monitor network 
traffic passing through that proxy machine. All of the maps 
used in this study are sketched using a map tool available at: 
http://obeattie.github.io/gmaps-radius/. 
II. LOCATION PRIVACY CONCERN 
 To initially test whether an application adopts location 
obfuscation to obscure the publicly shown distance of its user 
or not, we move around two accounts run in the virtual 
environment mentioned in Subsection I.D. The distance 
shown on each account is then recorded and compared with 
the real distance. From some preliminary results, we found 
that Grindr and Jack‘d (in default setting) do not adopt any 
location randomization, but show the exact physical distance 
of the user. As a consequence, the real location of the user is 
vulnerable to the trilateration threat model, which will be 
discussed in more detail in Subsection II.A. To prevent the 
risk of being located for its user, Grindr has already 
implemented a function which allows the user to hide the 
distance from being viewed by other users, while Jack‘d has 
not implemented any effective countermeasure to alleviate 
this risk. Nonetheless, in Subsection II.B, by deploying our 
proposed colluding-trilateration method, we will demonstrate 
that disabling the ―show distance‖ function still cannot 
effectively mitigate the risk. In contrast with Grindr and 
Jack‘d, Hornet seems to be better in protecting its user‘s 
location privacy by adopting location obfuscation in its 
system. As a result, we always get the distance shown on the 
 
2 https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.lexa.fakegps 
 application different from the real distance. However, in 
Subsection II.C, we will show how our colluding-trilateration 
model can still be applied to precisely locate Hornet user 
regardless of whether location anonymization and location 
obfuscation are enabled at a same time in Hornet. 
A. Trilateration Model 
As far as we are aware, the trilateration threat model (aka: 
triangulation) is said to be first reported to Grindr in 2014 
[11], and discussed in recent studies [4] and [5]. The main 
idea of this attack model bases on the distance from the user 
to the adversary, which is publicly shown to other users. With 
privilege no more than an ordinary user, an adversary just 
needs to move around the victim to three different places. 
Distances from the victim to the adversary at those three 
positions are then used to pinpoint the exact location of the 
victim. As shown in Figure 1, Grindr and Jack‘d users, who 
keep the default setting, are facing a high risk of being 
located since the adversary can obtain an accurate location up 
to the victim‘s building as highlighted in the red rectangle. 
With this threat model, we could not locate the victim in 
Hornet because the real distance is obscured, and the publicly 
shown distance is changed to new value every time we 
re-query it. Let us revisit Hornet in Subsection II.C. 
 
Fig. 1  Testing Trilateration Threat Model in Grindr and Jack‘d. 
From the geometry point of view, the location of the victim 
is nothing else but the coordinates of V, which is the solution 
(x, y) of a system of simultaneous circle equations. 
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Where: 
          ,           and          are latitudes 
and longitudes of the adversary at three different 
positions          respectively. 
 D1, D2, and D3 are distances from V to A1, A2, and 
A3 respectively. 
In response to this type of threat, Grindr has adopted a 
function in which the user can opt to hide the distance since 
August 2014 [12]. Thus, the trilateration model is no longer 
able to locate those users who already disabled the ―show 
distance‖ function. As we revisited [11] at the time of writing 
this paper, the map is no longer able to pinpoint Grindr users 
as shown in Figure 2. 
 
Fig. 2  Previous Grindr's flaw had been fixed. 
 For Jack‘d, it does not adopt the location anonymization 
policy to protect its user. Instead, it creates a function which 
allows its user to adjust the accuracy of the distance to three 
levels: close, near, and far (in iOS); or street, neighborhood, 
and city (in Android) as shown in Figure 3. 
 
Fig. 3  Jack'd Privacy Setting. 
 Notwithstanding these setting options, the publicly shown 
distance between two of our fake accounts does not change 
even when we restart the application to load the new privacy 
setting. As a result, this new function of Jack‘d does not 
guarantee the location privacy of its user at all. 
B. Your Neighbors are My Spies – Colluding Trilateration 
Despite of the fact that the best solution to protect the 
location information is not to publish it; in this part, as a key 
point of this paper, we will illustrate an enhanced version of 
the trilateration threat model that current approach like 
location anonymization implemented by disabling the "show 
distance" function still cannot effectively counter to. The 
primary factor in the success of this threat model bases on the 
way that Grindr arranges its users on the screen. Perhaps, in 
order to provide a high utility for the application, users are 
displayed left-to-right and top-to-down in an ascending order 
of their distances regardless of whether they have already 
 disabled the "show distance" function or not. By exploiting 
this fact, the two neighbors appear just before and just behind 
the victim on the application‘s screen unintentionally become 
the upper and lower bounds of the distance from the victim to 
the adversary. As a result, the region in which the victim is 
locating is easily obtained by employing the trilateration 
model again, but with two circles drawing from the adversary 
to the two nearest neighbors as shown in Figure 4. 
 
Fig. 4  Enhanced version of Trilateration Threat Model. 
By using this model, the adversary even does not need to 
view the victim profile three times to record the distance as 
done in the original trilateration model, but still very effective 
at locating the victim's region as marked in Figure 5.  
 
Fig. 5  The victim‘s region is smoothly bounded. 
Hence, instead of querying the distance information of the 
victim several times, the adversary just needs to query it from 
the two nearest neighbors (appear on the screen of Grindr) of 
the victim from three different points, once for each. As a 
result, no distance query from the adversary to the victim is 
issued in this enhanced model. Therefore, approach like 
limiting the number of queries issued to get the distance 
information from one user to another user is not adequate in 
this case. 
Moreover, a lesson learned from Figure 4 and Figure 5 is 
that the adversary gains more location information about the 
victim at A2 and A3 than A1, because the bounds set by the 
pairs of victim's neighbors from the viewpoints of A2 and A3 
are narrower than from A1. Therefore, even without drawing 
the pair circles from A1, the adversary can still confidently 
infer the possible region of the victim, because one of the two 
intersection areas is a river space, thus the probability that the 
victim is locating in that region is relatively low. Since 
discussing about the probability of possible activity region of 
smart phone user is beyond the scope of this paper; for more 
information, the reader can refer to [13], in which the 
probability of possible locations of smart phone user has 
already been discussed. 
So far, one may think that this type of attack model is not 
valid in case the victim locates in low-density area, because 
there are not so many neighbors around him for this attack 
model to take place. However, as far as we are concerned, 
using the term "victim's neighbors" actually is not always 
correct, because they may not physically locate near to the 
victim in real world. In fact, this attack model is still valid as 
long as the following condition holds: 
AN1 < AV < AN2 
Where:  
• AV is distance from the adversary to the victim.  
• AN1 and AN2 are distances from the adversary to the 
pair of the so-called victim's nearest neighbors. 
 
Fig. 6  Victim's neighbors are not necessarily close to him. 
In real life attack, the adversary can apply this model to 
attack the victim in remote area by placing himself in the 
middle of high-density areas and the victim's region as shown 
in Figure 6. The more crowded the urban areas are, the more 
resources that the adversary can obtain to precisely explore 
the victim's location. Or, in a more active attack fashion, the 
adversary can create two colluding accounts and move them 
around until he can satisfactorily compromise the victim's 
location. The key idea is to gradually reduce the subtraction 
 value of |AN1-AN2| such that V is still sandwiched by N1 
and N2 on the application‘s screen of the adversary. The 
smaller the subtraction value becomes, the more accurate 
location of the victim can be revealed. Up to this point, it is 
obvious that obtaining victim's real location from Figure 5 
becomes a trivial task. With this enhanced model, even when 
all local members hide their distances, the adversary can still 
make completely use of his colluding fake accounts to infer, 
thus be able to narrow down the possible region in which the 
victim is locating. That is where the name ―colluding 
trilateration‖ of our proposed method originates from. The 
idea is demonstrated in Figure 7. 
 
Fig. 7  Colluding Trilateration in Grindr. 
As illustrated, the adversary, whose account is marked 
with 1, can create two colluding accounts 2 and 3, then 
positions 2 and 3 in a way that the victim (Vic) is sandwiched 
between 2 and 3. Later, the adversary can gradually move 2 
and 3 so that the value of the distance between them becomes 
smaller while the victim remains in between of 2 and 3 on the 
screen, thus be able to precisely figure out the distance of the 
victim basing on the distances shown in the profile of the 
colluding accounts 2 and 3. 
C. Location Obfuscation is not enough 
While Grindr adopts location anonymization approach to 
protect its users from the trilateration threat model, Hornet 
adopts both location anonymization and location obfuscation. 
In other words, all of the publicly shown distances in Hornet 
are obfuscated as mentioned in our preliminary result above. 
Even from a same location, we keep receiving different 
distance values every time we issue a new query to reload the 
profile page of the victim. Therefore, we can initially confirm 
that Hornet does not use a one-to-one function to obscure the 
real distance. In addition to this feature, Horner user can also 
choose to hide his obfuscated distance from other users. As a 
result, Hornet seems to be better in protecting its user's 
location from the attack fashion of trilateration model. 
Indeed, Hornet was first released in 2011
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, later than 
Jack‘d (2010)4 and Grindr (2009)5, thus carefully designed 
with the concern of privacy and security issues [14]. 
Because Grindr is one of the first GLBT-focused 
applications introduced to the society, and widely used in 
North America, it has become a typical object for many 
studies ranging from privacy, psychology, gender to 
sexuality health and so on; while Hornet is new and has not 
been thoroughly studied, especially in the aspect of user 
privacy and information security. For instance, Hornet was 
recently discussed in [15], but the authors did not accurately 
study the distance obfuscation pattern of Hornet. Instead, 
they stated that Hornet sends the distance with 10 m accuracy. 
However, it is not true, since Hornet does carefully obfuscate 
the distance of its user as stated on its homepage [16]. 
Therefore, to the best of our knowledge, we are the first group 
that empirically studies the location privacy aspect of Hornet. 
In order to discover the location obfuscation pattern of 
Hornet, we repeatedly move around all of our adversary 
accounts to about 3000 different locations within 3 Km from 
our institute, and record both real distances estimated by 
ourselves and obfuscated distances shown in our Hornet 
accounts. Next, we scatter the data and obtain the graph in 
Figure 8. 
 
Fig. 8  Hornet Location Obfuscation Pattern. 
As we already noticed that Hornet does not simply use a 
one-to-one function to obscure the distance, we cannot just 
easily employ the regression analysis to figure out the 
location obfuscation pattern used in Hornet. By observing the 
recorded data, we found that Hornet is very careful in 
designing its location obfuscation scheme with three different 
strategies for three different ranges of distance, which are 
0~100 m, 100~1000 m, and above 1 km. Within the range of 
 
3 https://www.appannie.com/apps/all-stores/app/hornet/ 
4 https://www.appannie.com/apps/all-stores/app/jackd/ 
5 https://www.appannie.com/apps/all-stores/app/grindr/ 
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 0~100 m, Hornet makes the publicly shown distance equal to 
80 m for all of the distances which are shorter than 80 m. For 
distance longer than 80 m and shorter than 100 m, Hornet 
arbitrarily adds some noise to the real distance such that the 
obscured distance varies within 80 m and 100 m. We break 
down the Figure 8 to have a clearer view on the distance 
obfuscation pattern in the range of 0~100 m. 
 
Fig. 9  Hornet Location Obfuscation Pattern – Range 0~100m. 
Next, within the range of 100~1000 m, Hornet adopts a 
more complex obfuscation pattern that changes the publicly 
shown distance every time we refresh the victim profile to get 
the distance information. As a result, although the positions 
of our fake accounts did not change, we always got different 
values shown in our fake accounts. To deeply analyze this 
obfuscation pattern, we issue 30 queries from every single 
position and note down all the possible obfuscated results 
returned by Hornet. Breaking down the Figure 8 in the range 
of 100~1000 m gives us a clearer view. 
 
Fig. 10  Hornet Location Obfuscation Pattern – Range 100~1000 m. 
From Figure 10, we can conclude that in the range of 
100~1000 m, Hornet evenly randomizes the real distance 
with amplitude of 100 m. In more detail, a real distance, 
which is longer than 100 m and shorter than 1000 m, is first 
rounded to the nearest hundred. It is then obfuscated by 
adding an arbitrary number ranging from 0 to 100 with the 
step of 10. For example, if the real distance is 321 m, then the 
obfuscated distance is 300 plus any random value in the set of 
{0, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90, 100}. Thus, the publicly 
shown value can be any number between 300 m and 400 m 
with the step of 10. 
Finally, for distance longer than 1 km, Hornet applies 
another obfuscation pattern in which the real distance is 
rounded to the nearest one in the unit of km. For instance, 1.2 
km is rounded to 1 km, while 1.6 km is rounded to 2 km. 
 
Fig. 11  Hornet Location Obfuscation Pattern – Range 1 km ~. 
From the patterns discussed above, it is not an 
exaggeration to say that the obfuscation used in Hornet is 
very reasonable with respect to the privacy preserving for 
Hornet user. Distance of every user in the range of 0~1000 m 
is complexly obfuscated because this range is considered to 
be very sensitive to the user‘s location privacy; while 
distance longer than 1 km is simply obscured by rounding 
method because it is far enough to protect the user privacy. 
Also, showing the approximated distance for those users, 
whose distance is longer 1 km, does not have any bad impact 
on the utility of other local users. Therefore, the obfuscation 
does not only provide Hornet user with a better protection, 
but also makes it more difficult for the adversary to carry out 
the trilateration attack. That is the reason why we could not 
find out the exact location of the victim in Hornet when 
applying the trilateration model because three circles 
sketched from three different locations of our adversary 
accounts do not converge on one point.  
Nevertheless, we still have the colluding-trilateration 
method proposed in Subsection II.B to test in Hornet; 
because, same as Grindr, Hornet also arranges the users on 
the screen from left-to-right and top-to-down in an ascending 
order of their distances regardless of whether they have 
disabled the "show distance" function, and the publicly 
shown distance has already been obfuscated. Therefore, we 
reuse the colluding-trilateration to examine whether we can 
discover the real location of the victim or not. This time, we 
just move accounts 2 and 3 to obtain a same result as shown 
in Figure 7, but do not use the distances shown on these two 
fake accounts because they are already obfuscated by Hornet, 
thus not correct. However, because those fake accounts 
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 belong to us, we can always measure the real distances 
between them as side-channel knowledge without relying on 
the one shown in Hornet. 
Surprisingly, Hornet perhaps might have already 
envisioned about this type of attack and took a step ahead. 
What Hornet does is to randomly remove some users from 
the screen of other local users. In other words, at some 
positions, on the screen of account 1, we can see all of the 
victim (Vic) and accounts 2 and 3; but at some other positions 
we cannot. That means Hornet does not always show all 
surrounding local users on one‘s screen. Instead, it arbitrarily 
drops some users. As a consequence, we cannot set the upper 
and lower bounds for the victim‘s distance to conduct the 
colluding-trilateration. 
In order to bypass this countermeasure, we make 
completely use of the Favorites List of Hornet. Similar to 
most of other Social Network platforms, Hornet also has a 
feature in which a user can add other users to his favorite list 
like the ―follow‖ function in Twitter. Then, there is a separate 
tab for the user to view his Favorites List in which the 
favorite users in this list are also arranged from left-to-right 
and top-to-down in an ascending order of their distances 
regardless of whether they have disabled the "show distance" 
function, the publicly shown distance are obfuscated, or they 
are not shown on the local screen of other users. The trick is 
demonstrated in Figure 12. (Two accounts at the top-left 
corner are added by default for all users in Hornet to 
promote sexuality health.) 
 
Fig. 12  Colluding Trilateration in Hornet bases on Favorites List. 
Taking advantage of this Favorites List, the adversary first 
needs to add the other two fake accounts 2 and 3 to his 
Favorites List, and then also adds the targeted victim into this 
list at the first time he sees the targeted victim on the public 
local screen. That is how the adversary can anchor the victim 
even when the victim does not appear on his local screen. 
Finally, the locating problem becomes a same problem as 
shown in Figure 4. As a result, we were able to locate the 
position of the victim (Vic) in Hornet although all the 
distances are obfuscated and the victim already disabled the 
―show distance‖ function in his application. 
III. OTHER PRIVACY CONCERNS 
A. Vulnerabilities from Third-Party Advertisement 
Banner and Misconduct in Handling User's Personal 
Information 
In the age of online marketing, one's privacy is often 
threatened by the very advertisements popping up in his 
device as mentioned in [17] and [18]. In order to investigate 
this issue in Jack‘d and Grindr, we analyze packets captured 
while using these two applications. The experiment results 
are shown in Figure 13. 
 
Fig. 13  : Information Leak through Third-Party Ads. 
Surprisingly, in both applications, the third-party 
advertisements leak many important information of the user 
including name of Telecommunications Service Provider (i.e. 
KDDI), device's model information (i.e. iPhone 5), country 
code (i.e. JP), and last but not least: the name of the 
applications (i.e. Grindr and Jack‘d) which is the most 
sensitive information that no any straight-acting person wants 
the others to know the existence of such applications in his 
phone. It may have no problem if the packets are sent directly 
to the ads provider's server. However, what is worth 
mentioning here is that the packets are sent in an unencrypted 
fashion, thus widely open to an attack type known as 
man-in-the-middle attack, in which the hacker taps the 
Internet connection of the victim to eavesdrop the packets. 
By analyzing all the captured packets, we were further 
shocked by the fact that all the packets containing members' 
profile pictures of Grindr are also sent in the air without 
encryption, thus being captured and recovered back to the 
original image files as shown in Figure 14. 
  
Fig. 14  Pictures recovered from unencrypted packets in Grindr. 
Concerning ethical issue, we only recover image files that 
appear on the first screen page of Grindr as evidence, and the 
users' avatars are intentionally censored.  For Jack‘d, it is 
very careless in handling its user‘s private photo, because 
even when a photo is sent in a private message, Jack‘d does 
not use any secure connection to protect the photo. Instead, 
Jack‘d sends it via HTTP, which is an unsecure transmission 
protocol as shown in Figure 15. 
 
Fig. 15  Unsecure http protocol used in Jack'd to send private photos. 
Taking into account of the above findings, it is obvious 
that the user's privacy is not guaranteed at all although the 
vendor has been alerted to these issues by a security firm 
before [11]. 
As for Hornet, it is not necessary to do this experiment, 
because it has been already confirmed in [14] and [15] that 
Hornet carefully employs SSL certificates and HTTPS 
protocol for its connection. 
B. Together with IP Spy and Linkage Attack 
Next, as human being is born curious, social engineering 
intrusion techniques like phishing is always the easiest but 
effective way to compromise people. Since Jack'd provides it 
users with a feature to see who viewed his profile with 
timestamp, an adversary can put an IP-spy URL into his 
profile to promote his appearance, thus being able to obtain 
the victim's IP address if the victim feels curious and clicks 
on that URL. Nevertheless, as it was discussed in [19] that IP 
address is also important personal information which can be 
exploited to perform the linkage attack to retrieve other 
personal information. To have a clearer view on how this 
gimmick is really effective at luring innocent users, we place 
our Jack'd accounts in three big cities of Japan which are 
Tokyo, Osaka and Kyoto within 12 hours (from 6PM to 6AM 
of the following day) to estimate how many innocent and 
curious victims could be lured. We choose this time period 
because it is the most active usage time according to [20]. To 
conduct this task, we had to reboot the virtual machines every 
two hours so that our accounts will not disappear from the 
screen of other local users, as we found that Jack'd only keeps 
an account displayed on other user‘s screen for two hours 
since the latest login. The result is illustrated in Figure 16. 
 
Fig. 16  Analysis from IP-spy Intrusion Gimmick. 
In total, we got 131 viewers from three accounts with 41 
viewers clicked through the IP-spy URL we put in the profile.  
 
Fig. 17  Linkage Attack with IP-spy and Jack'd timestamp. 
18～21 21～00 00～03 03～06 
Tokyo 10 10 14 9
Osaka 10 21 8 4
Kyoto 10 24 8 3
Tokyo-click 1 2 2 2
Osaka-click 9 8 3 3
Kyoto-click 3 6 2 0
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 Among these 41 clicks, we were able to perform linkage 
attack to 26 users with high confidence by matching the 
timestamp between Jack‘d and our IP-spy server to further 
reveal other information including their IP address, ISP, 
display language and platform of their devices as shown in 
Figure 17. 
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Through this study, we would like to particularly alert the 
users of Grindr, Jack'd, and Hornet as well as the users of 
other LBS in general about the risk of being located easily 
regardless of whether the recent location anonymization and 
location obfuscation approaches have been adopted. By 
investigating these three applications, we found a paradox 
that although there have been many attack models proposed 
by the privacy-preserving researchers, the user‘s location 
privacy has not been seriously taken in to consideration by 
the LBS provider and the user themselves. As far as we are 
concerned, the reason of this negligence derives from both 
sides. From the viewpoint of the LBS provider, it might cause 
overhead to implement those sophisticated solutions 
proposed by the research community, while the utility of the 
application is not really guaranteed, thus probably lead to the 
loss of its customer. From the viewpoint of the user, it is 
maybe because of two reasons. Perhaps, the first one is also 
due to the trade-off of utility. The other one is because of 
unawareness. For that reason, in this paper, instead of using 
complicated mathematical equations and complex algorithms 
to show the threat models, we opt for visualizing it on maps 
and figures so that even those non-technical readers can 
understand how easily their privacy can be compromised in 
the current security condition. 
In order to alleviate the risks of man-in-the-middle attack, 
IP spy and other side channel attacks as mentioned in Section 
III, we urge the LBS providers and involved third-parties to 
carefully encrypt the connection from their servers to the 
users. For the user, we suggest not opening any URL out of 
curiosity. If it is really necessary to open an unknown URL, 
the user should turn on VPN at first to prevent the leak of 
their real IP address. 
For those threat models discussed in Section II, let us argue 
that privacy preserving policy is different from person to 
person. Especially in GLBT community, some already came 
out, thus have no concern about privacy; while some are 
straight-acting, thus do not want to be disclosed. Therefore, a 
centralized solution is not really suitable, and users are the 
very ones who need to make decision whether to protect their 
own privacy. For the meantime, while waiting for the experts 
and the LBS providers to discover a perfect solution for 
location privacy protection without trading off the utility, we 
suggest that the user should take a step ahead to protect their 
own privacy from those vulnerabilities mentioned in this 
study. That is to use Fake-GPS applications like the one that 
we use in this study (probably also used by most of the 
adversaries) to hide the real location to an acceptable extent 
so that the user can still gain the convenience provided by the 
LBS. How far the fake location should be shifted from the 
real one depends on how much utility and convenience that a 
user is willing to trade off with his privacy, thus different 
from case by case.  We strongly believe that this user-centric 
solution not only suits all type of users, but also helps to save 
the vendors from overhead investment in implementing 
sophisticated solutions and infrastructures.  
Apart from technical methods aforementioned, human 
factor is also important in protecting oneself in the 
cyberspace. In order to avoid troublesome problems in the 
future when the vendors get hacked as the case of Ashley 
Madison [6], the user should not register account to those 
highly sensitive applications under his real name or even a 
part of his real name. Instead, the user should use information 
that could not be used to link the account with his real-life 
personally identifiable information. 
Last but not least, in this paper, we of course could have 
utilized more complicated techniques to extract and test the 
accuracy of the threat models with more users of Grindr, 
Jack‘d, and Hornet in bulk. However, as far as we are 
concerned with the ethical issue that those compromised 
users also have their right to be undisclosed, and there may be 
our acquaintances among them. We thus did not go beyond 
those accounts created by ourselves. 
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